Note on the role of natural condition of control in the estimation of DSGE models by Martin Fukac & Vladimir Havlena
Note on the Role of Natural 
Condition of Control in the 
Estimation of DSGE Models 
 
Martin Fukac and Vladimir Havlena 
August 2011 
RWP 11-03 Note on the Role of Natural Condition of Control in
the Estimation of DSGE Models
Martin Fuka£y Vladim￿r Havlenaz
Abstract
This paper is written by authors from technical and economic ￿elds,
motivated to ￿nd a common language and views on the problem of
the optimal use of information in model estimation. The center of
our interest is the natural condition of control ￿ a common assump-
tion in the Bayesian estimation in technical sciences, which may be
violated in economic applications. In estimating dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, typically only a subset of endoge-
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11 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Peterka (1981), it has been well understood in
the technical sciences that on the way from the Bayesian formula to the
standard recursive least square method for an ARX model estimation, or the
Kalman ￿lter estimation, several assumptions about information contained
in observed input and output variables must be adopted. While such as-
sumptions are well justi￿ed and easy to interpret in technical applications
like LQG observer-based state feedback or adaptive control, the technical
assumptions may be violated in some other areas like economics.
Our attention is focused on the natural condition of control (henceforth
NCC or condition). We would like to stimulate the discussion on the proper
use of the information available to econometricians and on the adaptation of
theoretical model concepts to particular estimation algorithms. We review
the development of model estimation from a conceptual Bayesian solution -
resulting in a generic functional recursion on conditioned probability density
functions (c.p.d.f.) ￿ to famous Kalman ￿lter equations. We demonstrate the
loss of optimality in the case when the assumptions used for the development
of the standard Kalman ￿lter are not satis￿ed.
The natural condition of control is an assumption made in the control
system literature that simpli￿es the algorithm for the optimal estimation
of unknown variables like parameters or state (latent) variables using the
Kalman Filter. The condition says that if an external observer (econome-
trician/statistician) simultaneously observes and controls the system, then
his control decisions, if optimal, do not provide any additional information
about the state of the system, and vice versa.
The violation of NCC is di￿cult to detect in the data. It may be more
of an argument than a directly testable hypothesis. The problem is di￿erent
from that of model misspeci￿cation which manifests itself in residuals, shock
estimates, or inconsistent, model implied expectations. But if econometri-
cians and economic agents with a signi￿cant market power objectively know
that the condition does not hold (i.e. there are observed control variables
that are not explicitly included in their models while they should be and thus
2the NCC is violated), the NCC entitles them to use that knowledge in their
favor.
In contrast to many economic applications, the NCC is a credible assump-
tion in the technical sciences. The observer and controller are one person,
the system under his control is well identi￿ed, and he uses algorithms that
lead to optimal estimation and decisions. On the other hand, in economic
applications it is almost always di￿cult to argue that the condition holds,
because the observer (econometrician) is almost always di￿erent from the
controller. The econometrician observes the real-time decisions (about tax
revenues, production, consumption or prices) with a substantial time delay.
To avoid this problem, we assume that the models here describe economic
agents with signi￿cant market power. Natural candidates for the controller-
observer in economics are policy institutions like monetary or ￿scal authori-
ties which observe the markets’ behavior and, most importantly, have e￿ec-
tive tools to in￿uence them. The NCC does not apply to economic agents in
perfectly competitive markets because their size prevent their behavior from
impacting the aggregate markets. The condition may apply to the abstract
concept of a representative agent (which we do not explore here), or agents
with a signi￿cant market power such as policy institutions.
We review the condition’s validity for the estimation of dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We choose them because they have
become the norm for an optimal policy and decision analysis in policy insti-
tutions. At the same time, they are exactly the class of economic models for
which the NCC is the most relevant because they capture optimal decisions.
There are two direct implications of the NCC on DSGE models. First,
we can improve the e￿ciency of our estimates. Second, because the observed
control variable is a result of optimal decisions in these models, we can use
that variable to infer the encoded underlying information to improve our own
knowledge about the modeled system. The performance of our own model
can bene￿t if the underlying model of the particular optimal decision is of a
better quality than ours.
We show that the choice of observable variables matters. There are many
decision variables that are implicit in the DSGE models, but the variables
3have direct observable counterparts such as labor income, capital income, or
all kinds of fees or tax revenues. For model dynamics, they are of second-order
importance because they do not carry any extra information for the aggregate
dynamics, because output, prices, and interest rates carry the entire set of
information. But from the estimation point of view, the variables, if observed,
carry an important piece of information from which we can infer the beliefs
of the other (representative) agents with higher precision and use them to
improve our own (policy authority) beliefs. Every decision is a DSGE model
is, by de￿nition, optimal. And by the construction NCC, every decision
variable must be present in the estimation. Otherwise the Kalman ￿lter
does not provide optimal estimates.
The NCC provides a theoretical explanation and support, for example,
to the literature on the choice of observable variables (Guerron-Quintana,
2010), or DSGE models in a data rich environment (Boivin and Giannoni,
2006). Guerron-Quintana (2010) addresses the question of ￿why one should
be concerned with the choice of observable?￿ He experiments with di￿er-
ent sets of observables, and on a standard New Keynesian model he shows
the e￿ects that their choice have on the parameter estimates and overall
model dynamical behavior. At ￿rst sight his approach may appear as data
mining, because it is a very data intensive analysis, but in the light of our
argument, Guerron-Quintana exploration and ￿ndings may be justi￿ed by
natural-condition-of-control arguments.
Our arguments also go a similar direction like in Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) who propose a framework for exploiting information from a large
datasets to improve the estimation of DSGE models. In comparison to the
data-rich literature we provide justi￿cation why the use of all available in-
formation in estimation is a must: it is the dictate of the natural condition
of control. In contrast to Boivin and Giannoni, who work with empirical
relationships, we use only the information that can be linked directly to a
decision process captured by the model. 1 In that respect we are also using
1From the logic of NCC, the methodology proposed in Schorfheide, Sill and Kryshko (2010)
may be viewed as an ine￿cient use of available information. The o￿-model variables, if
relevant at all, should be used to update the information about the model states (variables,
endogenous factors), instead of being treated exogenously.
4the information springing from cross-equation restrictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we re-
view the derivation of the basic Kalman ￿lter equations from an engineering
perspective. It will help us to understand the motivation and consequences
of the natural condition of control. In the third section, we show how the
engineering world maps in to the world of dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models. In the fourth section, we illustrate our points on a neoclassical
growth model.
2 State Estimation and Output Prediction
In engineering, the typical motivation of parameter and/or state estimation
is the optimal control problem. The de￿nition of the model is then implied
by this task. Consider a discrete-time dynamic system depicted in Figure 1
with the observable/measurable input sequence ut and output sequence yt
and some hidden variables that can be interpreted as the system parameters
 or system state xt. The input sequence enters in a closed loop, in which
the control decision is based on the system states estimates.
Figure 1: Dynamic system (e.g., DSGE model)
 




52.1 Optimal control problem
Let the sequence of input and output data observed at time interval from t1
up to time t2 be D
t2
t1 = fut1;yt1;:::;ut2;yt2g. If the initial time t1 = 1, it can
be omitted, i.e. Dt
1 = Dt.
Suppose we have observed the input-output sequence up to time t and are









. This optimization problem requires the joint
probability density function p(D
t+T
t+1 jDt). Using the chain rule, this c.p.d.f.












The set of c.p.d.f.s p(yjD 1;u) for  = t + 1;:::;t + T de￿nes the
dependence of system output y on system history up to the time   1, and
the system input at time . These c.p.d.f.s de￿ne the model of the system.
The set of c.p.d.f.s p(ujD
 1
1 ) for  = t = 1;:::;t+T is a general descrip-
tion of the law by which the input u is generated. We will call this set of
c.p.d.f.s as the control law. Note the information delay in the control law;
while the input u is applied to the system to generate its output in the -th
period, the output y is not available to calculate the control law u. 2
2.2 State Estimation
If there exists a hidden (latent) variable xt of ￿xed dimension such that
p(xt+1;ytjD
t 1;xt;ut) = p(xt+1;ytjxt;ut)
it is called the state of the system. The state of the system xt constrains
all the information about the system history that is relevant to predict the
values fxt+1;ytg. Using the state de￿nition above, the output model can be
2In engineering applications it is typically assumed that a continuous process is observed
at regular intervals  = tTs with sampling period Ts and the input is constant during the
sampling period, i.e. u() = ut for tTs   < (t + 1)Ts.









This re￿ects the fact that for the prediction of state xt+1, the information
about the output in the t-th period is available and should be incorporated







information about the state given by the c.p.d.f. p(xtjDt 1;ut) is required at
each step of the recursion. That is the point at which the NCC comes in to
play.
Suppose the information about the state p(xtjDt 1) based on the data
up to time t   1 is available. This information can be updated after a new










where the properties of the state and the natural condition of control for the
state estimation (Peterka, 1981) p(xtjDt 1;ut) = p(xtjDt 1) are used to get
the second term.
The NCC assumption cannot be deduced from the properties of the dy-
namic system itself but rather from the process of information accumulation.
In the technical context, its interpretation is twofold:
1. The condition p(xtjDt 1;ut) = p(xtjDt 1) says that the control variable
ut does not provide any additional information about the state of the
system xt. This assumption is valid e.g. in the framework of observer-
7based LQG control ￿ incomplete information feedback ￿ with the control
variable based on state estimate ut = f (E[xtjDt 1]). In this case the
control variable ut does not provide any additional knowledge than the
information contained in the data set Dt 1.






the condition p(xtjDt 1;ut) = p(xtjDt 1) implies that also p(utjDt 1;xt) =
p(utjDt 1). If the state-estimation and control is performed by the same
subject, the system input is based only on the available data and is not
modi￿ed by the state estimate, which does not provide any ￿new￿ infor-
mation for the calculation of the control law.
3 General Equilibrium Models
Now we turn our attention to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. Their (log)linear form is
 0()xt =  1()Etxt+1 +  2()xt 1 +  3()"t; (1)
where xt is a (n  1) vector of endogenous variables (log-deviations from
their steady state), and "t is a (k1) vector of unobservable exogenous i:i:d:
shocks. For a simple notation, we assume that n = k. This assumption will
be relaxed in the later discussion.  0(),  1(),  2() and  3() are time
invariant matrices of structural parameters. Their elements are functions of
deep structural parameters, . Et(:) is the rational expectation operator con-
ditional on the model M and information available to the economic agents at
time t ￿ the information matrix is 
t 2 (xt;xt 1;:::;x0;"t;M). The structural
matrices  0(),  1(),  2() and  3() are such that the model has unique
and stable equilibrium.
Solving for the rational expectations Et(:), model (1) has a minimum
8state representation
xt = A()xt 1 + B()"t: (2)
Equation (2) characterizes the dynamic equilibrium in the reduced form.
A() and B() are functions of  s and through them they are functions of
the deep structural parameters .
The model states xt are linked to their observed counterparts via the
measurement equation
yt = Cxt; (3)
where yt is (m  1) vector of observable variables, and C is the (m  n)
(usually identity) matrix that maps the model variables into yt.
Equations (2) and (3) establish together the state-space representation
of the original model (1).3 When estimating (2) and (3), it is standard to
assume that (i) model (1) is a reasonable representation of the world and
the decisions taken in it, and (ii) yt is the only information that the outside
observer has available to estimate and evaluate xt.
If an external observer does not use all available information, the NCC is
violated and the Kalman ￿ltering may not be optimal, which sacri￿ces the
estimation e￿ciency of parameters and unobservable variables. We consider
two instances in which the NCC is violated.
3.1 Learning from others
If any additional information about the system state is available to calcu-
late the control law, the standard Kalman ￿lter is not optimal from the
Bayesian inference/information accumulation point of view. That is why
some applications in the economic literature may not fully comply with the
NCC assumption: typically in multi-agent environment where individual
agents operate based on di￿erent information content, the control action
of one agent may provide additional information to the remaining agents,
i.e. p(xtjDt 1) 6= p(xtjDt 1;ut). If this additional information is not used to
3It is useful to note at this point that if n = m the state-space model can be written as a
￿nite order VAR. If n > m, the model can be written as an in￿nite order VAR. If n < m,
the state space model is stochastically de￿cient.
9evaluate their optimal control strategy, their behavior is not optimal from
the Bayesian inference/information accumulation point of view.
As an example, assume a statistician observing a linear system controlled
by (complete information) state feedback. Then his (noisy) observation of
controlled variable ut =  Kxt + eu
t provides signi￿cant information about
the state.
If the statistician knows the control law K, interpreting the control vari-
able ut as an additional observation de￿ned by c.p.d.f. p(utjxt) = peu(ut +
Kxt) in parallel to the observed outputs yt = Cxt + Dut + e
y
t de￿ned by
p(ytjxt;ut) = pey(yt   Cxt   Dut), the optimal data update step of state









If the statistician does not know the control law K, he is not able to
incorporate this information into the state estimation process. However, if
he knows that NCC are not satis￿ed 4 and he is sure that the observed control
variable ut provides additional information about the state xt, he may try
to recover this information. One of his options is adaptation of his behavior
based on estimation of the control law K as an unknown parameter of the
observation model p(utjxt;K).
The NCC adds on an additional dimension to adaptive learning. The
basic Kalman ￿lter algorithm already utilizes the information from one’s
own past prediction errors. In contrast to learning from one’s own errors, the
violation of NCC calls for learning from the decisions and errors of others.
4detection of NCC violation may be a separate topic of interest
10Figure 2: Sampling from a continuous process - logic for the Kalman ￿lter
timing







The state equation (2) can be viewed as a model of control in closed loop (or
full-state control). The latent endogenous variables xt can be split in to two
parts:
 0()xt =  0(1)xt + ut:
ut =  0(2)xt is the cumulative e￿ect of the structural parameters  0(2).
If there is ut that is observed, we have to extend the observation equa-
tion (3) to inform the estimates of  and xt, similarly like in the previous
11subsection. Therefore, we augment measurement equation (3) to the form of






















An example of a variable ut in DSGE models can serve income tax, con-
sumption tax, or capital (property) tax revenues. They almost never explic-
itly appear in DSGE models. These variables are determined by a passive
￿scal policy. Tax rates a￿ect dynamics indirectly via resource allocation,
but the tax revenues per se never explicitly appear in the minimum-state
representation because they do not bring any additional information about
the aggregate dynamics. From the estimation perspective, including obser-
vations on tax revenues may be important. It is very often the case that
some of the variables in the minimum-state model do not have an observable
counterpart (e.g. capital stock or output gap). Then to minimize the un-
certainty around their estimates, any information on capital tax revenues is
very useful because it is structurally linked to the unobserved capital stock
and thus helps to e￿ectively infer its level. 5
5Similarly, the demand for money may add additional power to output gap forecasts. It
does not carry any additional information about the in￿ation rate and output gap, because
money demand on those factors. But exactly the very same reason dictates to include
money demand among observable variables if output gap is unobservable.
124 Illustration
This section illustrates our point that using the whole disposable informa-
tion may improve models’ adaptability and estimation e￿ciency. We use a
simple real business cycle (RBC) model to generate arti￿cial data of private
consumption, hours worked, investment, consumption tax receipts, and of
disposable income, which form our set of disposable information. First, we
assume that an econometrician (observer) uses only two series out of the
complete information set. Next, we gradually expand the set that the econo-
metrician utilizes. Then a similar exercise is repeated on actual data.
The RBC model is comprised of two sets of agents ￿ household and ￿rm.




 log(1   Lt)] subject to a budget constraint wtLt + (1   rt   )Kt 1 + Tt =
(1   c)Ct + Kt. The parameter  > 0 is the measure of household’s risk
aversion, and the parameter  2 (0;1) is the time discount factor. The
household’s welfare derives from consumption Ct and leisure 1   Lt. The
level of consumption is fueled by the habit Ht, which depends on the past
consumption and an i:i:d: habit shock Ht = Ct 1e"t, with  2 (0;1) and "t 
N(0;2
c). Time spent by work Lt causes disutility but it is compensated by
the hourly real wage wt. The consumption is taxed by the government at the
rate of c 2 (0;1). The household is the only owner of physical capital Kt in
the economy, which is, together with labor, a factor of production. Firms rent
the capital and pay the households the interest rt in return, but the physical
capital depreciates over time by the rate  2 (0;1). The household further
receives the lump-sum transfers Tt from the government, which operates on
a balanced budget.
Firms maximize their pro￿ts t = Yt rtKt 1 wtLt by optimally hiring
labor and capital to produce the consumption good Yt using Cobb-Douglas
technology: Yt = AtK
t 1L
1 
t . At is the total factor productivity and follows
a log-linear AR(1) process: logAt = logAt 1 + "A
t . The exogenous shock
"A
t  N(0;2
A) and we interpret it as the productivity shocks.  2 (0;1) is
the share of capital in production.
In equilibrium, all (labor, capital, and consumption goods) markets clear.
13The dynamic equilibrium is characterized by the Euler equation for con-





























t = Ct + Kt   (1   )Kt 1 (8)
logAt = logAt 1 + "
A
t (9)
We use the following values to parameterize the equilibrium:  = 0:60,
 = 0:97,  = 1,  = 3, c = 0:2,  = 0:01,  = 0:5,  = 0:9, c = A = 0:01.
The model is solved using the methodology proposed by King, Plosser
and Rebelo (1988). First, the model steady state is computed. Second, (6)
- (9) are log-linearized around the steady state, and we obtain the model
in the form of (1). Finally, the log-linear model is solved for the rational
expectations Et(:). The result is the state equation (2), in which there are
four endogenous variables
h
Ct Kt Lt At
i
, three of which are truly state






Having the model, we simulate the set of disposable information. The set
consists of the measures of private consumption  Ct, hours worked  Lt, gross
private investment  It, sales tax receipts  Tt, and disposable income  DIt. We
assume that the measures of these variables are published by a statistical
o￿ce. We do not measure any direct counterparts of the physical capital
stock and the total factor productivity. Those variables remain latent states
in the exercise.
The ￿rst two observed variables are direct counterparts of the state vari-
ables Ct and Lt. The other three are de￿nitions implicitly included in (6)-(9).
They are functions of the model’s endogenous variables. The gross private
investment is de￿ned as  It = Kt   (1   )Kt 1, consumption tax receipts
6[Ct 1;Kt 1;At 1] are the truly state variables. They form the minimum-state-variable
solution to the DSGE model. The equilibrium level of Lt follows from the marginal rate of
substitution between work and consumption, which is an intratemporal/static relationship.
14are  Tt = cCt, and the disposable income is equal to equilibrium production
 DIt = AtK
t 1L
1 
t . All the variables are measured with an error that is i:i:d.
4.1 Monte Carlo Experiment
We assume that an econometrician (observer), who wants to estimate the
model (6)-(9) decides to use the information contained only in the measures
of consumption  Ct and hours worked  Lt. He knows the structural model and
its parametrization, and he wants to estimate the latent states Kt and At.
The assumptions of this experiment resemble a set up common to eco-
nomic applications. The econometrician knows the disposable data, but he
decides to use the measures that are naturally the closest to the model vari-
ables. Because there are no direct counterparts of Kt nor At in his database,
he treats them as latent and estimate them. The structural parameters
are known to him and thus the econometrician only seeks Kt and At. The
Kalman ￿lter can deliver their optimal estimates.
The estimation results of this experiment are plotted in Figure 3. The
solid (pink) lines are the actual (simulated and known to us) series of Kt (top
panel) and At (lower panel). The widest (blue) interval corresponds in both
panels to the uncertainty of the estimates.
The econometrician’s choice of observable variables results in the loss of
e￿ciency and consistency. We see that very often the estimate of capital or
technology is indistinguishable from zero. The con￿dence intervals are wide
but at the same time may not include the actual series.
In the next step, the econometrician exploits the disposable information
a bit more. He realizes that the statistical o￿ce provides more data that is
structurally linked to his model and they can help to inform his estimates.
The light intervals in Figure 3 show the gain in e￿ciency and consistency
when the disposable income is introduced in the set of observable variables,
data on investment are similarly informative. The con￿dence intervals for
the capital stock and technology estimates shrink. The estimates become
statistically signi￿cant and more closely match the actual underlying trajec-
tory of the latent variables. The tax revenues contribute only marginally to
15the estimates accuracy.
Figure 3: Estimates of capital stock and labor productivity (MC experiment)



















































Obs + DI Obs + T
Obs + I






















































Note: The graph presents the results of a Monte Carlo experiment with model (6)-(9) as
parameterized in the text. The shocks are drawn from iids. In both panels, the solid line
is the actual series (capital stock - top panel; technology - lower panel). The shaded bands
around the actual series are the estimated 2std (smoothed) con￿dence intervals conditioned
on a set of observables. The baseline information set (Obs)￿ consumption and hours work
observed ￿ and the baseline set extended for the consumption tax receipts (Obs+T) yield
the two widest con￿dence intervals. The baseline set extended for disposable income
(Obs+DI) or investment (Obs+I) provide the most narrow con￿dence intervals and pin
down the level of the actual states very precisely.
16This Monte Carlo experiment also illustrates why the violations of the
NCC di￿er from the problem of model misspeci￿cation and therefore is hard
to detect. Unlike model misspeci￿cation, the violation of the NCC does not
have a clear manifestation in the estimation outcome, e.g. shock estimates
are not i.i.d. The Kalman ￿lter optimally process data information. It
always provides optimal estimates of all latent variables. For example, all
con￿dence intervals plotted in Figure 3 are based on a well speci￿ed model
and well behaved estimates so more of them can be dismissed as ine￿cient
or inconsistent. And still some of the data sets well outperform others in
estimation.
In practice, it is di￿cult to make ad hoc claims which of available data
add the most e￿cient information, but the model structure may help with
the inference. Prior to any estimation we can evaluate the Fisher informa-
tion matrix. We may infer how much new information we can expect to
obtain when asking a particular set of data. It is a coherent way to summa-
rize and analyze the information content for example presented in Figure 3.
The Fisher Information matrix can help us to prioritize among variables we
consider to select from the set of available information, which may be par-
ticularly helpful if we happen to have a constraint on available computation
power. In contrast to the selection criteria proposed in Guerron-Quintana
(2010), the analysis of the Fisher information matrix appears as a cleaner
way to prioritize among observable variables, because it does not require any
prior data information.
4.2 Estimated Model
Now we repeat the above experiments with actual US data. In contrast
to the prior analysis, we will see that, empirically, consumption, and hours
worked su￿ciently inform the estimates of capital and technology. Adding
the observations on the ￿xed private investment does not add to the e￿ciency
very much.
The data used in this section are taken from the Federal Reserve Eco-
17nomic Data managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 7 We use
the annual series of the real personal consumption expenditures (mnemonic:
PCECCA96), annual series of real private ￿xed investment (mnemonic: FPICA),
and annualized series of total hours worked, which is the product of monthly
seasonally adjusted series of average weekly hours worked in private industries
(mnemonic: AWHNONAG) and of the total non-farm payrolls (mnemonic:
PAYEMS). Per capita terms are taken with respect to the total civilian la-
bor force (mnemonic: CLF16OV). There are two time spans we consider.
The ￿rst one is relevant for consumption and spans from 1949 to 2009. The
second time span is for hours worked and investment that we observe from
1965 and 1967, respectively, to 2009. The model is estimated on the relevant
samples between 1950 and 2009.
Because model (6)-(8) is without nominal rigidities, we treat it as a growth
model and estimate it on an annual frequency. Because of the non-stationary
nature of the actual data, we modify the technological process to include a
stochastic trend. Instead of (9) we now assume that the technology At is labor
augmenting and follows the ￿rst-di￿erence stationary process with drift:
logAt = (1   )  A + logAt 1 + "
A
t : (10)
  A > 0 is the drift term, which sets the economy on an exogenous but
balanced growth path. Both capital and consumption grow at that rate in
the long run.
The transitory parameters f;g and the variances f"c
t;"a
tg are estimated
using the maximum likelihood.8 The other parameters are kept ￿xed at their
parameterized values mentioned above. We will not report their estimates
and instead we again focus on the estimates of the capital stock Kt and labor
augmenting technology At.
Figure 4 summarizes the basic results. In the top two panels, we compare
the con￿dence intervals for the smoothed estimates of Kt and At. The panels
show the relative e￿ciency of the capital stock estimate (top left) and labor
7Web page http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ .
8The parameters are estimated to allow for a better data match. It does not pose a
fundamental change to the setup of the experiment.
18augmenting technology estimated (top right) when (i) the information on the
growth of consumption and hours worked is used (model 1), and (ii) when
that information is extended with the investment growth (model 2). The
shaded areas are then computed as 100(std(Xt;model1)=std(Xt;model2)   1).
Positive values mean that the model two ￿ model with more information,
outperforms the model one ￿ model with less information.
The model with more information (Figure 4, model two) helps to improve
the estimate of the labor augmenting technology (right panel). Early in the
sample the relative e￿ciency of model two is 7 times higher than of the
model with less information. The relative advantage of model two gradually
diminishes as model one adapts and as its e￿ciency improves over time. In
2010, the relative e￿ciency of model two is already only 2 times better than
of model one.
We recall that the estimates are smoothed estimates; that is, the early
estimates of At are based on the complete information set available at time
T. That is why the model with more information performs better over the
whole sample even if the extra information in the form of investment growth
comes in after 1967.
In the instance of capital stock (Figure 4, left panel), model two starts to
outperform model one shortly before the year 1971, when the new information
from hours worked and investment begins to feed in. Early in the sample,
the model with less information performs almost 7 times better than the
model two. This is the price of the improved estimate for the technological
process in this time period. After 1971, the model with more information
again clearly outperforms model one, delivering estimates of the capital stock
that are twice as e￿cient as in model one.
One may wonder why the observations on investment do not provide even
higher gains in e￿ciency. The model’s good (in-sample) predictive power for
investment provides an explanation. The graph in the bottom panel of Figure
4 compares the model implied investment (when treated as latent in model
one) to the actually realized (observed) data. Clearly, the data on private
consumption expenditures and hours worked by themselves contain enough
information about investment and thus the capital stock and also technology.
19Figure 4: Estimates of capital stock and labor productivity (US data)












































Note: The top two panels show the relative e￿ciency of the capital stock estimate (top
left) and labor augmenting technology estimated (top right) when (i) the information on
the growth of consumption and hours worked is used (model 1), and when that information
is extended with (ii) the investment growth (model 2). The shaded areas are computed as
100(std(Xt;model1)=std(Xt;model2)   1).
5 Final Remarks
We reviewed the basic derivation of Kalman ￿lter equations with the focus
on the role of the natural condition of control. We were interested in what
this condition implied for the estimation of DSGE models used in economics.
We provided a theoretically consistent justi￿cation for the use of all available
(observable) information that can be structurally linked to the model. Under
the assumption of information pooling, we illustrated that this leads to a
signi￿cantly improved estimate e￿ciency.
20The NCC can provide an alternative structural perspective for DSGE
model developers. The model may be well speci￿ed but the NCC still can be
violated. It is because the condition does not deal with the model structure
per se, but rather with the ￿ow of information in it.
In future work we would like to look at the possible avenues for formal
testing of the NCC, which can be used for an empirical assessment of en-
dogenous decision rules. DSGE models consist of optimal decision (control)
rules, so each equation can be subject to testing. Another possible avenue for
research is to relax the assumption of information pooling, and look at the
case of an agent with signi￿cant market power and private information. If
the NCC should hold, the remaining market players can try to infer the pri-
vate information encoded in the decisions of the dominant player and adapt
to it.
References
Boivin J., and M. Giannoni (2006), ￿DSGE Models in a Data-Rich Environ-
ment,￿ NBER Working Paper No.12772.
King R. G., Plosser Ch., and Rebelo S. T. (1988), ￿Production, growth and
business cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model,￿ Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, vol. 21(2-3), pages 195-232.
Peterka, V. (1981), ￿Bayesian Approach to System Identi￿cation ￿ in P.
Eykho￿ (ed) Trends and Progress in System Identi￿cation (Pergamon Press),
Oxford. Also available at http://moodle.utia.cas.cz/moodledata/4/peterka.pdf
Schorfheide F., K. Sill, and M. Kryshko (2010), ￿DSGE Model-Based Fore-
casting of Non-Modeled Variables,￿ International Journal of Forecasting , vol
26(2), pages 348-373.
Guerron-Quintana P. A. (2010), ￿What You Match Does Matter: The Ef-
fects of Data on DSGE Estimation,￿ Journal of Applied Econometrics , vol.
25(5), pages 774-804.
21